Illusions of Villainy

In order to win public opinion to its policies, the Reagan administration has sought to give a heroes-and-villains account of what is happening in Central America. Almost 40 percent of President Reagan's May 9, 1984 televised public address on his Central American policy was devoted to criticizing Nicaragua.

The Nicaraguan revolution is not faultless, but portraying it as "totalitarian" or "terrorist" runs directly counter to the experience of many Nicaraguan Christians and of many U.S. Christians who have visited Nicaragua. It appears that Nicaragua is the target of a propaganda campaign whose underlying purpose is to provide a rationale for a deepening U.S. intervention in Central America. What follow are responses to the most frequently heard statements of the propaganda campaign.

"The Sandinistas have betrayed the Nicaraguan revolution."

Some Nicaraguans, mainly the upper classes who hoped that after Somoza's downfall they would have the same prestige and power as before, believe that the Sandinistas have betrayed the revolution. Most Nicaraguans, however, view the overthrow of the dictatorship as the first step in a revolution that would reorganize the economy and society so that the needs of the majority would be met. The changes made so far are viewed as a beginning.

"Due to Sandinista mismanagement, Nicaraguans are worse off than they were before."

Some benefits to the people are obvious. During 1980, illiteracy was reduced from 52 percent to 13 percent. School enrollment has doubled. Many formerly landless peasants have received land. Health care has been extended, especially in the rural areas. Mass vaccination campaigns against measles, diphtheria, and polio are fighting those diseases, and malaria has been virtually eliminated.

However, Nicaragua has had to face enormous economic obstacles: a treasury sacked by Somoza and his associates, a foreign debt equaling almost a year's gross domestic product, falling world prices for its exports, and disastrous floods and droughts. In addition, the United States has used its veto power in international lending institutions to block development loans to Nicaragua.

More than 60 percent of the economy remains in private hands, and the government offers credit to businesspeople who seek to keep their enterprises running and to reinvest, and it has sought especially to channel credit to small- and medium-sized businesses and farms. Even large, private cotton, coffee, and sugar plantations and cattle ranches continue to operate as long as their owners pay taxes, follow labor regulations, and do not disinvest. Many large private businesspeople, however, resent what they regard as unjustified government interference.

Due to these conditions, the world recession, and the economic crisis of all Central America, Nicaragua has had little new private investment.

Despite these obstacles, the United Nations Commission on Latin America states that the Nicaraguan economy grew five percent in 1983 while all other countries in the region showed no growth or a decline.

Under difficult conditions the Sandinista revolution has struggled to meet basic needs, while making investments that will provide jobs and greater income. One major accomplishment is that Nicaragua is now self-sufficient in the basic staples of corn and beans. During 1984 it is becoming clear that development is taking second place to survival as Nicaragua prepares to defend itself against what it regards as an almost inevitable attack from the United States.

"The Sandinistas have reneged on their promises to hold free elections."

Most Nicaraguans see their efforts to build a more just society with ongoing grassroots participation (not just at election intervals) as democratic. As a part of this process, they plan to hold elections in November 1984. Some of the previously existing political parties support this process and some do not. Most observers agree that if elections were held today the results would show vast support for the Sandinista revolutionary program.

"Nicaragua is heading down the familiar road of Marxist totalitarianism."

Nicaraguans insist that their revolution is "Sandinista"—that is, it takes its inspiration from Augusto Cesar Sandino, the nationalist hero who withstood the U.S. Marine occupying force for five years. "Sandinismo" thus emphasizes the nationalistic side of the revolution, its aim to be Nicaraguan and not a copy of any other model.

For many Americans "Marxism" is an automatic put-down word; in Latin America, however, Marxist terminology and ideas are as pervasive as psychological jargon is in the United States. Many Latin Americans find that Marxism helps them analyze the roots of their society's problems and the need for structural change. The Sandinistas do not deny the element of Marxism in their policies, but they believe they can use it flexibly and non-dogmatically.

Just as the Sandinistas are seeking to work with a mixed economy, they propose political pluralism. What they have in mind is pluralism within the revolution. The aim is to encourage participation and criticism from those who support the overall direction of the Sandinista revolution.

Nicaragua might seem to be a one-party state, but so is Mexico. From the viewpoint of ordinary citizens, the key question is not so much whether parties compete in particular kinds of elections but whether their governments are responsive and whether they as citizens have a role in shaping policy.

Most Nicaraguans would not judge their government to be totalitarian.

"The press has been suppressed."

In the United States, La Prensa has often been portrayed as an independent paper, bravely resisting Sandinista harassment and censorship. This paper did play a major role in the anti-Somoza struggle. However, soon after Somoza's downfall, it began to take an anti-Sandinista line. At that point the bulk of its employees quit La Prensa and joined one of its owners in setting up El Nuevo Diario.

Many Nicaraguans view La Prensa as the voice of the anti-Sandinista elites and even as a tool to undermine the revolution. They see a clear historical precedent in the example of El Mercurio in Chile, which received CIA funding and was a major tool for the destabilization campaign that paved the way for the military overthrow of the elected Allende government. La Prensa seems to be following a similar model when it gives distorted reporting on food shortages, for example, and so creates a climate of insecurity. The overall line of La Prensa is similar to themes of the U.S. government: it creates the impression that Nicaragua is becoming a Soviet-aligned state and that the Sandinistas are hostile to religion; rarely does it find anything to praise in the revolution, and rarely, if ever, does it condemn the CIA-sponsored and -organized attacks on Nicaragua.

In dealing with La Prensa, the Sandinista government has tried to maintain a balance between safeguarding free expression on the one hand, and making sure that the revolution is not undermined. Its actions have become increasingly severe: La Prensa has been closed briefly, and pre-censorship has been imposed to prevent news coverage that might disrupt the country. Many Nicaraguans, very aware of what happened in Chile, agree that these measures are justified; others think that even under adverse conditions, the revolution would be better served by maintaining freedom of expression.

North Americans may be applying a double standard. One researcher found that of eight New York Times stories on the Nicaraguan elections scheduled for November 1984, six mentioned the issue of press freedom; and yet, of some 30 stories on the Salvadoran elections filed during the same period, the issue of press freedom was not broached, despite the fact that no opposition press is allowed in El Salvador and journalists have been murdered there. In Guatemala approximately 50 journalists have been murdered, and many others have had to flee, with only minimal interest from the outside world.

"The Sandinista government is repressive and violates human rights."

International human rights commissions of both the Organization of American States and the United Nations have given Nicaragua generally high marks on human rights. Contrary to what has happened after almost all revolutionary victories, no executions of members of the Somoza forces took place. The death penalty was abolished. Those National Guard members convicted of crimes were sentenced to prison; those judged innocent were set free.

Accusations of large-scale atrocities in Nicaragua, when examined, have been found to be without evidence. Human rights organizations such as Americas Watch have expressed concern about arbitrary arrest and detention of people for political reasons. In its report of April 1984, Americas Watch stated that the fate of about 70 Miskito Indians who disappeared in 1982 and some 28 non-Miskitos who disappeared in 1983 had not been clarified. The report points out that these disappearances took place in remote areas and that no case of such disappearances of Miskitos had occurred after 1982. If these people indeed disappeared in the hands of Sandinista forces, it is a severe human rights violation. However, the figure pales by comparison with Guatemala and El Salvador, where tens of thousands have disappeared in recent years. Moreover, in Nicaragua some Sandinista soldiers have been brought to justice for human rights violations.

"The Sandinistas are seeking to destroy genocidally the Miskito culture and people."

Serious problems persist between the Sandinista government and the Miskitos. These are rooted in history, but they have been aggravated by Sandinista errors and exploited by the CIA. Indigenous people—Miskitos, Sumos, and Ramas—and the English-speaking blacks living on the Atlantic coastal plain make up about 4 percent of the Nicaraguan population. Their history has been quite separate from that of the rest of the country. They were colonized by Great Britain. They had little contact with the rest of Nicaragua and were mistrustful of the "Spaniards," as they call those from the Pacific side. The Atlantic side was largely untouched by the anti-Somoza struggle.

When the Sandinistas arrived in 1979, they inherited the existing mistrust of the "Spaniards," and their own insensitivity to the particular experience of the people increased that mistrust. In addition, the Miskitos were seeking autonomy in government, land rights, and the rights to natural resources on their lands.

Tensions increased, and events came to a head in February 1981 when the top leaders of the MISURASATA—the name means "Miskitos, Sumos, Ramas, Sandinistas, together"—were arrested by the Sandinista authorities. They were soon released, but Steadman Fagoth, the indigenous representative on the Council of State, went to Honduras where he joined ex-Somoza guardsmen in counterrevolutionary activities. Eventually most of the other MISURASATA leaders also left Nicaragua and some became linked to anti-Sandinista groups.

In February 1982, in response to increasing attacks from Honduras, the Sandinistas decided to transfer inland the people living along the Honduran border. As they did so, they destroyed villages to prevent their being used by counterrevolutionary forces. Even those Miskitos who had experienced the cross-border attacks and agreed the transfer was necessary were saddened and angry. An estimated 18,000 Miskitos have left Nicaragua for Honduras out of a total Nicaraguan Miskito population of 80,000. Two thousand have been trained as combatants and are fighting the Sandinistas.

Since the CIA-organized and -financed contras would like to seize a portion of Nicaraguan territory, declare it "liberated," and then call for recognition from governments unfriendly to the Sandinista revolution, the "Miskito question" is inevitably part of the larger struggle going on in Nicaragua.

The Sandinistas publicly admit some errors and insensitivity to the indigenous people. Americas Watch, while reporting improvement in relations between the Sandinistas and the Miskitos, states that "serious problems remain."

"The Sandinistas have persecuted the churches and even organized mobs to insult the pope."

The churches find themselves divided over the revolution. Many grassroots pastoral workers see participation in the revolution as a practical consequence of their faith, and many lay church members agree. In addition to the well-known Christian participation of priests in the government, there are many Christian lay people who work with the revolution because they believe it offers the possibility of building a society more in accordance with the gospel. CEPAD, the umbrella organization of Protestant churches, works well with the Sandinista government in development projects.

However, most (but not all) of the Catholic bishops oppose the Sandinista government, fearful that it will become a classic Marxist regime. In their outlook and views, these bishops are quite similar to the anti-Sandinista middle- and upper-class groups. Archbishop Obando y Bravo is the leading public figure opposing the government.

This situation offers many opportunities for anti-Sandinista groups, who would simply be rejected if they openly expressed their intention of rolling back the revolution. Religious language and symbols can serve as a code for counterrevolutionary groups.

Christians who support the revolution not only regret the use of Christian symbols to serve the counterrevolution, but they also fear that this behavior represents a tragic pastoral failure: the revolution offers the church opportunities for a new kind of evangelization, opportunities that will be missed if the church's leaders use their positions to undermine the revolution.

During March 1983, Pope John Paul II visited Nicaragua in this atmosphere of division. The Sandinista government declared a national holiday and provided bus transportation for all Nicaraguans to Managua (using more than two months' worth of fuel). During his Mass in Managua, the pope said nothing about the accomplishments of the revolution or about the attacks from outside, and showed no sympathy for the sorrow of families mourning the loss of 17 young people killed on the border a few days before. The people became impatient and, as is their custom, began to chant slogans, such as "We Want Peace!" The pope became visibly angry and shouted back "Silence!" three times. All evidence shows that the encounter was spontaneous.

"Nicaraguan 'freedom fighters,' including some former Sandinistas, are seeking to liberate Nicaragua from the Soviet-aligned comandantes who have usurped the revolution."

Since 1979 some former Somoza National Guardsmen have been based in camps in Honduras. In 1983 another group began operating out of Costa Rica. These groups have found some sympathizers and collaborators in the border regions, but their main support comes from the United States.

No revolt exists within Nicaragua. The upper and middle classes are dissatisfied at the loss of their power. On the other hand, some of the poor are dissatisfied at what they see as the slowness of the revolution; for example, the Sandinistas have restrained peasant organizations from simply taking land. But support for the revolution remains strong.

The anti-Sandinista groups do not agree on what they propose for Nicaragua. The FDN (Nicaraguan Democratic Front) intends to reverse the Nicaraguan revolution by turning back land reform. Eden Pastora, the military leader of the ARDE (Democratic Revolutionary Alliance), claims his main objection to the Sandinistas is the Cuban influence in Nicaragua. The bulk of the CIA funding has gone to the FDN, but revelations of CIA funding for the ARDE forces as well further discredit Pastora, who is often touted as a hero of the anti-Somoza struggle. His popularity is overestimated in the United States.

By themselves, the anti-Sandinista groups cannot overthrow the Sandinista revolution, and they are incapable of igniting a revolt within Nicaragua, since most people there, whatever complaints they might have about the Sandinistas, recognize that a contra government could only be the most extreme sort of repressive dictatorship. Contra behavior (killing, raping, pillaging, destruction) indicates that any government those forces might form would be repressive. Hence, the people do not regard them as "freedom fighters" but as "Somocistas."

Implicitly recognizing that the contras were not successful, the CIA in the fall of 1983 moved toward conducting its own operations without Nicaraguan participation (bombing, sabotage, harbor mining).

"With their 2,000 security advisers, the Cubans play a predominant role in Nicaragua."

During most of their struggle, beginning in 1960, the Sandinistas have had only sporadic contact with Cuba. In 1978 when the Sandinistas had become a serious contender for power, the Cuban government showed more interest and provided them with some help. Immediately after their victory, the Sandinistas established close ties with Cuba. Several thousand Cuban doctors and teachers have worked in Nicaragua, and Cuba has helped with development projects such as constructing new sugar mills. However, there are several thousand other foreigners working with the Nicaraguan revolution, including several hundred Americans.

Cubans helped set up the Sandinista security apparatus, undoubtedly drawing on 20 years of experience dealing with U.S. hostility to their country. There is no public evidence for the figure of 2,000 Cuban security advisers. Nevertheless, since much Nicaraguan military equipment is from the Eastern bloc, there may well be a substantial number of Cuban military technicians present.

So far the Nicaraguan revolution differs from the Cuban model in several important respects, reflecting the Sandinistas' recognition that their revolution is unfolding within different circumstances. For example, the stress on a mixed economy in part is a recognition of the shortcomings of the Cuban economy. Despite the fact that several thousand Cuban doctors and health-care workers have served in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas have chosen not to adopt the Cuban doctor- and hospital-centered model of medicine, but to stress village-level health promoters.

One of the most important differences is in the role of religion. In Cuba the churches by and large either served as refuges for those resentful of the revolution or served counterrevolutionary purposes. Consequently, Marxist atheism prevails in public life and practicing Christians cannot be members of the Communist party. In Nicaragua, by contrast, although the Sandinista government is a secular state, religion plays a great role in public life and many Sandinistas are practicing Christians.

"Nicaragua is aligned with the Soviet Union."

The Sandinistas intend to remain non-aligned, partly out of principle and partly out of pragmatism. Nicaragua's most helpful allies have been Western European democracies, who have provided considerable development aid. When the CIA mining of Nicaraguan harbors was made public, France offered to help clear the mines, and Holland later offered to pay for their clearing. Mexico and Venezuela have offered oil on easy terms, while Argentina and Brazil have offered Nicaragua credit.

Aid from the Soviet Union and some Eastern European countries has been significant. No doubt the Soviet Union would like to see a revolutionary regime in what the United States tends to regard as its "backyard." However, Moscow has made clear it will not put vast sums of money into subsidizing another country like Cuba.

"The Sandinistas are supplying arms to the Salvadoran guerrillas, who maintain their command and control center in Managua."

The Salvadoran insurgency is the outgrowth of a local struggle within El Salvador going back many years, to the early 1970s. Until 1978, El Salvador seemed much more ripe for revolution than Nicaragua.

Since they took power, the Sandinistas have made no secret of their support for the opposition groups in El Salvador. Most Nicaraguans identify with their struggle just as large numbers of other Central Americans draw inspiration from the Nicaraguan revolution. It is also true that Managua serves as a convenient area for Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran opposition political and diplomatic work (as do Mexico City and San Jose, Costa Rica). No doubt the Sandinista leaders follow the Salvadoran revolution closely and offer advice. We may assume that arms sales may be facilitated in Managua. Nicaragua may function as a kind of "rearguard" (in guerrilla terminology). But this does not make it a "command and control center."

To date, no convincing public proof exists of continuous and substantial arms shipments from Nicaragua to El Salvador, despite many millions of dollars spent by the United States to monitor and intercept such traffic. Some observers believe significant shipments did take place in 1980.

What seems most plausible is that the Salvadoran insurgents have obtained arms from a variety of sources. Some no doubt passed through Nicaragua, probably with Sandinista involvement. Today the most important source seems to be the Salvadoran official forces themselves, through arms lost in combat or sold by officers. Any Nicaraguan involvement in arms transfers is at the most a marginal element and in no sense should serve to define the problem in Central America.

"With its military buildup, Nicaragua is a security threat to its neighbors."

Nicaraguans regret the effects of their militarization. Ordinary citizens have to do militia drill and leave school or work for months to do patrol, while the development plans of the country are disrupted as resources are diverted into defense.

More than 1,500 Nicaraguans have been killed by counterrevolutionary forces during the last three years. Property has been destroyed, and production has been disrupted. Yet what Nicaraguans fear is that the United States intends ultimately to destroy their revolution by military force. U.S. officials have pointedly refused to rule out attacks on Nicaragua, and the frequent military exercises in the region (such as Ocean Venture II in mid-1984, involving 33,000 U.S. personnel) are clearly designed to intimidate Nicaragua.

Besides its armed forces of about 25,000 troops, Nicaragua has built up a militia of 100,000 or more reservists. (It is curious that no one described the Guatemalan government's creation of a peasant militia involving 400,000 men in 1983 as a threatening "military buildup," despite the Guatemalan army's claim on neighboring Belize.)

Nicaragua regards its actions as defensive, and military experts who have made on-site examinations concur that its equipment would not serve it for attacks on neighboring countries. For instance, it has virtually no air force. But militarization has its own dynamic. The real threat is that the present postures and actions could escalate into a regional conflagration in which all parties and the people would lose.

"United States efforts toward peace, democracy, and development are thwarted by Nicaragua's refusal to negotiate in good faith."

Both in its rationale and in its actions, the United States administration policy points toward deeper U.S. military intervention. The Nicaraguans see the dispatching of a fleet to Central America with more firepower than all Central American armies combined, and the presence of 5,000 or more U.S. troops in Honduras, as a provocation. This means, in effect, that the U.S. is getting everything ready to use any sort of Nicaraguan action that could be interpreted as "aggression" against Honduras as a pretext for direct attacks on Nicaragua. Articles in the U.S. press have speculated that the United States could defeat the Sandinista army in a matter of days. To the Nicaraguans the U.S. invasion of Grenada looked like a dress rehearsal for an attack on their own country.

These events have impelled other nations, and particularly the "Contadora group"—Mexico, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela—to renew their efforts to find negotiated alternatives. Most governments of Western Europe and Latin America oppose the militaristic thrust of present U.S. policy and urge negotiations.

U.S. government spokespersons have given verbal support to the Contadora initiatives, but U.S. policy has undermined it by announcing or carrying out massive military exercises precisely when Contadora countries were outlining peace proposals. U.S. policy is fundamentally at odds with the Contadora initiatives: if there were mutual agreements banning foreign military advisers, bases, arms shipments, and aid, the United States could be satisfied that there is no Soviet military presence in Central America; the Nicaraguan government could reduce its emphasis on defense and return to development, while the Salvadoran army and government would no longer have the United States to prop them up. The United States seems unwilling to accept reciprocity in peace settlements; it is unwilling to acknowledge that its military presence in Central America is foreign.

If there is to be peace in Central America, the United States must recognize that the Nicaraguan revolution is a fact, and that the Sandinista government enjoys broad support among the majority of its people. The Nicaraguans have every reason to want to reach an accommodation with the United States, since their economy, history, and culture are tied to those of the West.

Phillip Berryman was Central American Representatives for the American Friends Service Committee from 1976 to 1980. He is the author of The Religious Roots of Rebellion: Christians in Central American Revolutions (Orbis Books, 1984).