The Case for Diplomacy

Armed confrontation between Iraq and the U.S.-led military forces assembled in the Gulf will produce no winners. Any scenario one may concoct or envision that involves substantial military clashes will result in multiple losers. In short, war in the Gulf, however strong the perceived impetus, is a lose-lose proposition.

The potential human costs, even in a short-term conflict, are staggering. Numerous religious and some political leaders in the United States have spoken clearly and forcefully to this point. Various individuals and groups now have merged into a formidable chorus opposing the massive U.S. military buildup and warning of devastating consequences should armed conflict erupt.

Moral and spiritual objections to this war are compelling enough. But the likely political consequences argue against the military option as well.

Amid the daily barrage of television, radio, and newspaper "coverage" of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, surprisingly little public debate has centered on the potentially disastrous political consequences of a military confrontation. In our political arena, where the "long term" is defined by the next closest election, few people are asking hard questions about the middle- and long-term implications should this conflict be settled on the battlefield.

Now, not after the fact, is the time for policy makers, religious leaders, editorial boards, op-ed writers, and concerned citizens to explore, examine, and debate not only the moral bases for U.S. policies, but also the possible political scenarios related to policy decisions. Such reflection may be painful; it may also be highly productive.

Several major, long-term consequences -- all negative for the United States -- come immediately to mind. These should give pause to those who advocate the Clint Eastwood school of diplomacy. Consider the following.

Suppose a "best case" military solution wherein the U.S.-led forces hit Iraq in a surgical strike: Saddam Hussein and his top associates are eliminated and Iraq's military power is decimated, with its future weapons production capability rendered inconsequential. Victory? Hardly. Before the dust has settled, political consequences will begin to come into focus.

First, the devastation of Iraq would create a power vacuum in the most volatile and heavily armed region of the world. Any number of national or revolutionary leaders might step into that vacuum and, in turn, create or stimulate an even more tenuous and explosive regional situation.

One has only to recall the rhetoric and behavior of various Lebanese, Israeli, Palestinian, Syrian, Iranian, and Libyan extremist groups and leaders during the past decade. The simplistic view that sees Saddam as the major problem is doomed from the outset. Eliminating this admittedly brutal leader may well unleash new, even more unpredictable, dynamics in an area teeming with deep frustrations and unresolved conflicts.

A second consequence follows from the first: People with deep frustration and little hope for a better future will be further marginalized and radicalized by a U.S.-led military victory over Iraq. Having lived for more than four centuries under the political hegemony of outside powers (from the Ottomans to the colonial powers and, most recently, the two post-World War II superpowers), people in the Middle East long for freedom, independence, and self-determination.

They want no less for themselves and their children than do people in Eastern Europe, Southern Africa, and Central America, yet their aspirations have been thwarted time and again by national, regional, and international political machinations. Long-suffering patience is nearly exhausted, particularly as dramatic events in other parts of the world make clear that real political change is possible.

The sources of frustration are many. Unresolved conflicts -- most notably between the Israelis and Palestinians and among the various factions in Lebanon -- serve to destabilize the entire region. The changing alliances and interplay among different non-governmental groups and recognized governments complicate the intricate web of regional politics. The failure to address these ongoing regional conflicts constructively will exacerbate frustrations and catalyze extremists who appeal effectively to people with little hope.

Some of the turbulence in the Middle East today stems from lingering manifestations of colonialism. Frequently, the boundaries of nation-states divide people arbitrarily. What sense does it make, for instance, to divide the Kurds into four different countries (Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq) or the Soviet and Iranian Azerbayanis into two?

Saddam Hussein's charge that Kuwait is an artificial creation of the departing British colonialists contains an element of truth. At a popular level, his rhetoric appeals to a strong sense of inequity in the current configuration of nation-states. The hypocrisy of Saddam's insensitivity to these same issues in relation to the Kurdish minority in Iraq does not negate the force of his rhetoric in the region.

Another source of frustration derives from the policies of unrepresentative governments. At the beginning of the 1990s, many of the Middle Eastern countries are ruled by a military government or a monarchy. Rarely are such leaders in power by virtue of popular choice. Frequently, the relationships binding such countries to other regional or global powers keep them in a position of dependency. Add in the all-too-familiar pattern of corruption, excess, and brutally repressive domestic policies and you have a recipe for popular discontent.

In such a climate dominant outside forces offer a convenient target for the widespread anger. The United States and Israel, at times rightly and at times unfairly, currently provide a focus for popular frustration. A devastating military assault on Iraq by the United States would cement such an orientation in the minds of an entire generation of Middle Easterners. Without question, such a tragic episode would be widely perceived in terms of what the United States did to the Arab people in a selfish attempt to control oil resources.

However quickly events might flourish and fade from the news in the West, in the Middle East the war will be seared into the consciousness of people with long memories. The event would spawn a variety of unpredictable, sometimes violent responses for 10 to 20 years.

The political consequences outlined above presuppose a highly improbable "best case" scenario. With nearly one million soldiers poised for combat and sophisticated "conventional," biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons at the ready, a more gruesome clash is far more likely.

The daunting prospect of massive loss of life was stated rather dispassionately by a former undersecretary of state for the Near East at a recent gathering of Middle East scholars. Reflecting on the factors inhibiting a U.S. military offensive, he told us, "The Pentagon estimates some 25,000 to 30,000 American casualties minimum in the event full-scale ground fighting occurs." He then conceded that the administration recognized how difficult it would be to "sustain popular support" for its policies should the American casualties reach these levels.

The calculating, matter-of-fact tone of his discourse was chilling. At another level, I was heartened to know that policy makers are keenly aware of domestic political ramifications of another unpopular, ill-conceived war.

Finally, there should be no ambiguity about the far-reaching and explosive political consequences of this war if Israel is drawn into the fray. Saddam Hussein and others will do whatever it takes -- from firing missiles at Tel Aviv to using chemical weapons -- to provoke Israel. Once Israel responds, the whole picture changes.

Middle Eastern nations aligned in opposition to Iraq will be faced with the dilemma of altering their allegiance or being perceived as linking arms with Israel and the United States to fight another Arab state. Unstable regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere may find it impossible to ignore popular sentiment and remain in power. No one can predict what political configurations may result. This much is clear: The status quo will not remain.

Before dismissing such considerations as secondary, U.S. policy makers would do well to recall and ponder unfolding events in the wake of the Iranian revolution of 1979. Well over 10 years after a popular revolution dislodged the Shah -- whom Henry Kissinger once called America's "unconditional ally" -- strong anti-American sentiment is still present in Iran. And it has informed the actions of other groups in the region. There are lessons here for those with ears to hear, eyes to see, and brains to think.

I suggest no easy answers to this volatile international stand-off. Even so, it is increasingly clear that the only viable way forward is to be found in the political and diplomatic arena.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait not only precipitated the crisis, it remains the central sticking point in any non-military resolution. The world community has spoken decisively, most powerfully through the Security Council of the United Nations: Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait and allow Kuwaiti sovereignty to be restored. Iraqi aggression and human rights abuses must be opposed. The question is how.

Political and economic sanctions have been instituted with broad-based support. While considerable debate has centered on the efficacy of sanctions, a growing consensus -- including many members of the U.S. Congress -- recognizes that patience and persistence are required. In response to the charge that the costs to the United States are too high to wait for sanctions to work, former Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara said the following to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 4, 1990: "Surely we should be prepared to give the sanctions 12 to 18 months to work, if we wish to achieve our political objectives ... Who can doubt that a year of blockade would be cheaper than one week of war?"

To date, the American-led response to Iraq has primarily featured negative incentives -- punishing sanctions and the threat of military assault. To be successful, diplomatic and political efforts must concentrate not only on the "stick" but also on the "carrot." Although there are no easy answers or quick fixes, there are positive incentives that could be incorporated into the framework of a negotiated settlement.

First, a resolution could include mechanisms for addressing a number of previously existing issues between Iraq and Kuwait. These include disputes over borders and the islands of Warba and Bubiyan; exploitation of the Rumailah oil field; adherence to OPEC production quotas; and payments of loans incurred during Iraq's 10-year war with neighboring Iran.

Second, Iraq has repeatedly spoken of the need to work for resolution of the major regional conflicts. The point is well-taken. Without formally linking Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait to other issues, the community of nations could seize this moment to focus renewed efforts toward resolving conflicts between Israelis and Palestinians, as well as among the Lebanese and the Cypriots.

Both President Bush and Secretary of State Baker have indicated a commitment to regional peace processes and intimated that the United States is prepared to get on with that agenda. They should be encouraged to continue making these points publicly.

In the process of restoring Kuwaiti sovereignty, much-needed democratic reforms could be instituted. Recent conferences and pronouncements of exiled Kuwaitis who advocate such reform provide reason to hope substantial changes are feasible.

The movement toward a negotiated end to the crisis could be facilitated greatly by confidence-building measures. Gestures of good will -- such as allowing the resupply of embassies or visible evidence that the sanctions are not impeding the flow of medical supplies -- could prove as critically important in the short term as was the December 6 decision to release foreign hostages.

Every effort should be made to encourage dialogue. The initiative announced by President Bush on November 30 represented a hopeful sign. Although parameters for the proposed meetings between the respective presidents and counterpart foreign ministers were tightly defined, the call for face-to-face dialogue was appropriate.

Whatever progress results from such initiatives, the United States and the United Nations should be seeking multiple avenues for dialogue. Key figures such as King Hussein of Jordan and selected European leaders may well be the best interlocutors for building the trust needed for diplomacy.

In the absence of a blueprint, diplomatic and political efforts will take time and require concerted efforts by a variety of parties to the conflict. It is possible, in my view, to find appropriate ways to address legitimate issues without, in effect, rewarding Saddam Hussein for his aggression. In view of the alternatives, the most prudent course of action requires that all non-military avenues be pursued with patience, resolve, imagination, and perseverance.

The crisis in the Gulf presents extraordinary dangers; it also provides an opportunity to see systemic problems clearly and address them constructively. In the event the current standoff is resolved non-violently, it is essential that the world community learn from these traumatic events.

Now, more than ever, the United States and other nations must shift from a stimulus/response mode to a proactive one. Several major learnings illustrate the necessity for concerted efforts to chart a new course for the future.

The first lesson involves oil. The industrial world's dependence on fossil fuels is at the heart of the American-led response to the invasion of Kuwait. At the very least, the United States and other major consumer nations must begin immediately to implement measures for energy conservation as well as vigorously pursue safer, more reliable, and renewable sources of energy (see "What Price Oil?" by Jim Wallis, October 1990).

Global energy and economic interdependence are realities that are here to stay. The pragmatic concern to avoid similar crises and the moral imperative for responsible stewardship of shared resources ought to stimulate new patterns of behavior.

This crisis illustrates dramatically the political, economic, and ecological interdependence of the global community. The prospect of disruption in the flow of oil from the Gulf sent shock waves throughout global financial markets: oil prices soared; stock markets in New York, London, Tokyo, Bonn, and Sydney gyrated daily in response to rumors from the Middle East. This reality, coupled with numerous other evidences of interdependence -- from the depletion of the protective ozone layer in the Earth's atmosphere and pollution of the oceans to the impact of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster and the consequences of further destruction of the Brazilian rainforest -- leave no doubt about the necessity for exploring new ways to address common concerns.

The clarion call for multinational approaches applies directly to the regional disputes in the Middle East. Clearly, these cannot be isolated from the larger human community. The time for creative and courageous international approaches to the Israeli/Palestinian, Lebanese, and other conflicts is now. The issues are many and complex, but they are not beyond resolution.

Current events in South Africa provide an instructive model. The road ahead in that country will be long, circuitous, and full of detours. Still, Nelson Mandela is out of prison and dialogue is under way. There are reasons for hope and incentives for pursuing nonviolent alternatives in order to achieve the necessary societal changes. Palestinians, Israelis, Lebanese, and others also need tangible evidence that diplomatic and political options, not the military ones, provide the only viable means to resolve their bitter disputes.

Steps must be taken to build trust and begin meaningful forums for dialogue and negotiation in the Middle East. The United Nations Security Council provides the most hopeful context for progress. The United States bears a major responsibility in this process. The behavior of our government, the major actor in the post-Cold War era, will be a decisive factor in the success or failure of multinational efforts to resolve such daunting problems.

Finally, the crisis in the Gulf speaks volumes about immanent dangers posed by the proliferation of sophisticated weaponry. The Middle East, per capita, is the most heavily armed region in the world. For decades arms merchants have hawked their wares shamelessly, flooding the region with weapons. The United States is the No. 1 supplier of armaments; the Soviet Union is No. 2; France, Great Britain, and Germany round out the top five, with other nations vying for a lucrative piece of the action.

Surely now it must be clear to everyone that this profit-driven pattern of behavior is dangerously counterproductive. The lame argument reiterated ad nauseam in the past, "If we don't sell arms, someone else will!" must give way to a decisive multinational effort to halt and reverse this whole enterprise.

The grim reality of mass destruction from sophisticated "conventional" weapons coupled with the prospects of tactical use of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons makes clear the futility and insanity of war. Without delay, the community of nations must seek ways to defuse this ticking bomb, create mechanisms to halt further proliferation, and implement ways to monitor the arsenals that threaten us all. Standing on the brink of a precipice, "progress" is defined as a step backward.

The crisis in the Gulf presents people of faith with challenges that cannot be ignored. We must work actively to help prevent war. And, we must seize this moment to recognize and alter destructive patterns of behavior. Failure to address root causes and systemic problems will ensure that other crises will arise and thwart hopes for stability and peace both in the Middle East and elsewhere on our fragile, interdependent planet.

Charles A. Kimball was a Southern Baptist minister and associate professor of religion at Furman University in Greenville, South Carolina when this article appeared. He served for seven years as the Middle East director for the National Council of Churches.