An Elaborate Web of War

Like salt in a wound, news of the shipment of official U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan contras has been painful for many of us. Knowing that the money and guns are flowing--the beginning of the $100 million in aid approved last June--has made us even more acutely aware of our limited capacity to help our Nicaraguan brothers and sisters by influencing U.S. policy, and of the increased pain and suffering those dollars are sure to bring.

The $100 million in contra aid represents a fundamental, qualitative difference in the United States' war against the people of Nicaragua. No longer limited to covert funding and guidance of a proxy army, the Reagan administration plans to supplement its monetary aid with the full array of U.S. military, intelligence, and administrative resources.

The contra war is deepening, and U.S. involvement in it is escalating to new, yet frighteningly familiar, levels. In the words of Republican Sen. David F. Durenberger of Minnesota, hardly a strong opponent of U.S. policy in Nicaragua, "Regardless of what anybody says, this is Vietnam."

Some of us have been sounding that warning for a long, long time. And a New York Times/CBS News poll conducted last April found that 62 percent of the respondents said they "fear the United States will get involved in Nicaragua as it did in Vietnam." The signposts of intensive, long-term U.S. commitment to the Nicaraguan war are more numerous and evident than ever.

AS IN VIETNAM, U.S. involvement in the Nicaraguan conflict has progressed from a haphazard, ill-conceived pattern of CIA operations, U.S. military advisers, and economic and military aid, to a comprehensive and coordinated war effort. The Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and all branches of the U.S. military are now, or soon will be, involved in the effort to help the contras overthrow the Sandinistas. Gen. John R. Galvin, head of the U.S. Southern Command in Panama, is in charge of creating the master plan for the best use of the $100 million.

Part of that plan calls for Green Berets to train contra troops on U.S. soil. The governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, and particularly Honduras, knowing the contras' terrorist tendencies, refused to let them train in their countries, forcing U.S. military officials to search for suitable training sites in the United States. The plan also calls for U.S. Air Force and Navy personnel to transport supplies to the contras.

Another important factor in U.S. designs against Nicaragua is the National Guard. Since 1981, more than 22,000 guard troops from 40 different states have had training missions in Honduras, where they build roads and "temporary" air bases and airstrips which displace thousands of peasants, train the Honduran army, conduct good-will missions among peasants, and transport supplies that often reach the contras. Guard operations have by-passed U.S. expenditure limits and congressional restrictions for large military construction projects.

Nine state governors, fearing their guard units would be aiding the U.S.-backed contra effort against Nicaragua, have refused to allow their units to train in Honduras. But last August Congress added an amendment to the colossal defense authorization bill that stripped governors of this authority, giving full control of the National Guard to the Department of Defense and opening another door to the involvement of U.S. troops in Nicaragua.

The Reagan administration is spinning an elaborate web for the Sandinistas, all the while becoming more and more entangled itself. Key to any possible military success, of course, are additional aid requests for the contras. The $100 million in contra aid, $300 million in economic aid to other Central American countries, and all the related plans involving U.S. personnel, contra training, and other political and economic investments have already led one administration official to ask, "How are we ever going to cut this thing off?"

The United States entered the Vietnam War through a process of indirection, indecisiveness, and inertia. It had poured more than $1 billion into South Vietnam even before committing any U.S. troops to the conflict. By the time the United States finally lost the Vietnam War, the toll was more than 58,000 American dead, 300,000 American wounded, more than one million Vietnamese dead, and more than 250 billion U.S. dollars.

Once again, the U.S. government is marching to war, paving the road with deception and outright lies to its people. But this time hundreds of thousands of U.S. citizens are naming the lies and the parallels, and as U.S. involvement in the Nicaragua war escalates, so do protests and actions against it. We still can turn the tide.

Vicki Kemper was new editor of Sojourners when this article appeared.

This appears in the January 1987 issue of Sojourners