For one of the few times in its 45-year history, the United Nations was truly center stage during the Gulf war. Much of the negotiations, decision making, and action of the international community in response to Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait occurred in the chambers of the U.N. Security Council. And the newly efficient and determined body, long limited in its effectiveness by Cold War rivalries, was marked by unprecedented cooperation between its five "permanent" members -- China, France, the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and the United States.
But in the aftermath of the Gulf war, many questions remain about the "successful" use of the collective security apparatus of the United Nations. The answers will determine what role the United Nations will play in bringing genuine peace and stability to the Middle East, as well as in resolving future conflicts and acts of aggression in other parts of the world.
The Security Council was established by the U.N. Charter in 1945 as the highest and most powerful body in the organization, responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Its resolutions are the only ones that are binding on all member states.
The Gulf crisis demonstrated that the Security Council can respond swiftly and resolutely to a clear act of aggression. The blatant action of Iraq brought a clear and unanimous condemnation from the international community. This unanimity, combined with a commitment of the five permanent members to take a collective response to the invasion, led to a series of 10 U.N. resolutions that utilized the U.N. Charter's provisions for non-military sanctions in a way never seen before.
The more questionable actions of the Security Council began with resolution 678 (adopted November 29), which set the January 15 deadline and authorized the use of "all necessary means" to compel Iraq to leave Kuwait. Unlike the previous resolutions, which clearly embodied the provisions of the charter, resolution 678 bypassed the provision for collective use of force (article 42) under the authority of the Security Council; the council opted instead for a blanket approval for the countries present militarily in Saudi Arabia to take whatever actions they deemed necessary to get Iraq out of Kuwait.
This trend continued with resolution 687 (passed on April 3), which established the conditions for a permanent cease-fire. Many of these conditions -- including the destruction of all of Iraq's chemical and nuclear facilities, weapons, and missiles; the determination of the Iraq-Kuwait border; and the creation of a fund to pay reparations (financed by a percentage of Iraq's oil revenues) -- have been questioned by some members of the council and many U.N. observers, who feel such actions may interfere with Iraq's sovereignty.
Both resolutions (678 and 687) demonstrate that the Security Council can take most any course of action it decides to -- as long as the permanent five members agree -- even if it is not in strict adherence to the letter of the U.N. Charter.
THE RECORDS of the Security Council meetings during the Gulf crisis reveal that most of its members were not inherently opposed to the use of force. Most would have preferred a peaceful settlement -- through non-military action -- but there was also a recognition that Iraq could not be allowed to remain in Kuwait. So even if the United States essentially dictated the terms of resolution 678 (setting the January 15 deadline), its principles were acceptable to most of the other members of the council.
As one U.N. observer pointed out, the U.N. Security Council accurately reflects the power relationships in the world; so it should not be surprising that the permanent five members (led by the United States) largely determined the actions of the council -- and the secretary-general (SG) of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar -- during the Gulf crisis.
The role of the secretary-general has been the subject of much discussion in recent months. It is widely agreed that his office was weakened by the Persian Gulf crisis after a string of successful efforts in Afghanistan, Namibia, and Central America.
As chief executive of the United Nations, the secretary-general was bound by the decisions taken by the council. Only when the Security Council is deadlocked or in agreement simply on a general framework does the SG have considerable maneuvering room to try to devise a solution based on his own initiatives. The council's detailed management of the Gulf crisis essentially sidelined Perez de Cuellar.
Nevertheless, some in the United Nations community wished that he would have made at least one public initiative to try to pull the council and the international community in the direction of a peaceful solution, using the moral authority that the office commands.
The secretary-general did designate on March 1 (soon after Operation Desert Storm ended) an emergency mission to Iraq and Kuwait, under the leadership of Undersecretary-General Martti Ahtisaari, to assess humanitarian needs in the aftermath of the war. His objective reporting on the devastation and desperate humanitarian needs -- in Iraq especially -- broke through the limited and often biased reports coming from the region. This led the council to ease sanctions immediately on all foodstuffs and other basic necessities, such as fuel, chemicals for water purification, and generators.
The emergency mission also re-established the United Nations' moral voice, separating the organization from the U.S.-led coalition that had fought under U.N. approval, by stating clearly the impact the war had on Iraq's people and infrastructure.
BUT THE MILITARY ACTIONS sanctioned by the United Nations could hinder its role as peacemaker in the Middle East. As one diplomat from the region commented, "People will welcome the humanitarian and economic assistance, but the United Nations will be judged on its political decisions and actions." For the United Nations to re-establish and maintain its credibility with countries in the region, it will need to balance its enforcement and peacemaking responsibilities.
Special funds established by the U.N. Development Programme, the Food and Agricultural Organization, and other U.N. agencies to meet the critical humanitarian, environmental, and economic needs will be essential in beginning the healing process. Likewise, the U.N. peacekeeping force now in place on the Iraq-Kuwait border should help stabilize that area and allow the remainder of the coalition forces to withdraw.
But the provisions of the cease-fire agreement (resolution 687) may create resentments directed against the United Nations as the administering authority. More important, the role of the United Nations in resolving the other major problems preventing regional stability -- chief among them the Palestinian question and the Arab-Israeli conflict -- remains to be seen. The U.S. government does not appear to favor a major role for the United Nations on these questions. But if the United Nations does not show consistency in resolving these other concerns addressed by resolutions awaiting action, its credibility could suffer.
The most critical question -- how the permanent five members plan to utilize the United Nations in the future -- remains unanswered. The actions taken during the Gulf crisis demonstrated for the first time a strong U.N. enforcement capability, but largely ignored its peacemaking role. To live up to its principles outlined in the U.N. Charter, both aspects must be present in actions taken in the name of the United Nations.
The secretary-general reminded the Security Council last September that any collective enforcement on the part of the United Nations must demonstrate that "the way of enforcement is qualitatively different from the way of war; that it strives to minimize undeserved suffering to the extent humanly possible; that what it demands ... is not surrender but the righting of the wrong that has been committed; [and] that it does not foreclose diplomatic efforts to arrive at a peaceful solution consistent with the principles of the charter and the determinations made by the Security Council."
On all of the counts just listed, the U.N.-sanctioned response to Iraq failed. This test must be met in the future if the United Nations is to claim fully the higher moral vision set forth in the charter, and be more than just another collection of states serving solely their own interests.
James L. Cairns was seminar program coordinator for the U.N. Office of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) when this article appeared.
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