A Fragile Experiment: Nicaragua

Cows graze next to the capital city's only skyscraper. The 18-story edifice rises out of downtown Managua, a field laced by roads and dotted with abandoned buildings that have stood for a decade as they are now; among some of the ruins squatters have made their homes. Downtown Managua is a political comment on power and poverty, a parable of U.S. influence around the globe.

The lone building that brushes the Nicaraguan sky is the Bank of America. For years it has stood tall as a symbol of U.S. economic and political power in Central America. As if to say that U.S. power was unshakable, the bank alone stood through the 1972 Managua earthquake, while the rest of the downtown buildings bowed to the earth's awesome force.

For decades there was another symbol of U.S. power in Central America: the name Somoza. The history dates back to the beginning of the century, when the U.S. government forced out Nicaragua's president and established a puppet regime. The new U.S.-backed regime safeguarded the interests of U.S. mining and fruit companies, as well as ensured Nicaragua's strategic importance for inter-oceanic travel and military campaigns (the Bay of Pigs invasion was later launched from Nicaragua's shores). To enforce U.S. control, the Marines occupied the country from 1911 to 1933.

In the late 1920s and early '30s, a small man emerged with great prominence in Nicaragua. His name was Augusto Cesar Sandino. Sandino was a beloved leader committed to improving the plight of the poor, particularly through literacy training. He was a nationalist who loved the people of his country and was determined to free them from U.S. imperialism, fighting the Marines until Franklin D. Roosevelt finally withdrew them.

Before the Marines departed, however, the U.S. established a National Guard in Nicaragua, and the Marines hand-picked Anastasio Somoza Garcia to head it. On February 21,1934, Sandino was invited to dinner with Somoza. After the meal a picture was taken of the small Sandino and the large Somoza in an embrace of friendship. This turned out to be a "Judas hug," as Sandino was murdered by Somoza's men on his way out, an action that had been cleared with the U.S. ambassador.

When Somoza was assassinated 22 years later, his eldest son, Luis, took over Nicaragua. After Luis' death in 1967, his brother Anastasio Somoza Debyle inherited the dynasty. This Somoza was more than a brutal dictator in his own country. He earned the title "King of Central America," coordinating a network of economic and political associations throughout the region, as well as heading CONDECA, the alliance of Central American armed forces. He sat on the throne as protector of U.S. interests in this little empire.

Somoza created a country of extreme poverty while amassing a personal fortune worth half a billion dollars. His holdings included half of the arable land of Nicaragua and 40 per cent of its industry. He made the way clear for U.S. companies to appropriate Nicaragua's land and exploit its labor.

Witnesses remember that more than 600 planes landed in Managua following the earthquake with relief aid, food, clothing, and medical supplies. None of the aid ever got into the hands of the Nicaraguan people; Somoza pocketed the money and sold the supplies.

Although thousands of Nicaraguans were left homeless by the earthquake, the city of Managua was never rebuilt. For seven years, until his overthrow in 1979, piles of rubble stood in what had been downtown Managua as monuments to Somoza's corruption and neglect.

As opposition to Somoza grew throughout the country, he became barbaric and systematic in his reprisals against the Nicaraguan population. Escalating brutality only strengthened the opposition. The effects of the Somoza dynasty's 45-year reign of terror can still be felt in Nicaragua. Ghosts of fear return when people remember.

As we traveled through the Nicaraguan countryside, we were shown points of Somozan history: "There is the hill where Somoza took the people to massacre them. Over by the lake a mass grave of 200 bodies was uncovered. Up there on the hill is the former Boy Scouts headquarters, which Somoza took over to use as a fortress from which to bomb and nearly destroy the city of Masaya." In this sunny land of picturesque lakes and volcanoes it's hard to believe that such history took place.

For years this reign of brutality and the U.S. power and money that backed it indeed felt unshakable. But in July 1979, the king was dethroned, a significant blow to U.S. hegemony in the region.

Sandino's spirit had re-emerged to bring Somoza's downfall: the peasant leader's nationalist philosophy became the foundation of the revolution that challenged Somoza's power. Carlos Fonseca Amador, a Nicaraguan intellectual was "the mind behind the revolution." He brought together many groups--labor, students, women, peasants--

and formed them into a common front named in honor of Sandino: the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN). Fonseca was killed in 1977 during the revolutionary war and with Sandino has become a national hero. An eternal flame marks his grave in Managua's central plaza.

The front had broad popular support. The grassroots Catholic church, feeling the effects of Vatican II and the bishops' council at Medellin at which the church proclaimed itself to be on the side of the poor, was a strong participant in the liberation struggle.

A strong nonviolent component accompanied the armed struggle. Along with numerous marches and general strikes, a widespread tactic involved tearing up the "Somoza bricks" from the cities' paved roads. Somoza owned the factory that made the bricks and sold them to the people at exorbitant prices. During the insurrection, the people piled them up as barriers to the advance of Somoza's National Guard.

Almost four years later, the U.S. government still has not recovered from the shock or adjusted to the idea that a smaller nation has broken free from its power and control. Like a bully who has just been put in his place, the U.S. has gone around the neighborhood looking for allies to help it wreak revenge and recover its pride. It has found Honduras.

Honduras is being used as the base of operations for a covert plan aimed at destabilizing the Nicaraguan government. In an effort coordinated from the U.S. embassy, the U.S. government has supplied arms and logistical support to the Honduran army and counterrevolutionaries operating on the Honduras-Nicaragua border and has encouraged incursions into Nicaraguan territory. The counterrevolutionary forces, or contras, include former Somoza supporters and members of his National Guard as well as some Miskito Indians whose home is in the border frontier area.

In early February the U.S. coordinated joint maneuvers with Honduran troops in the border area aimed at sending a message to Managua. The Washington Post reported that the maneuvers also had the intent of "preparing Honduras for the possibility of war with Nicaragua."

The Nicaraguan people are understandably fearful. They are victims of a military operation on their border that is coupled with an intense propaganda campaign being waged in the U.S. to discredit their government.

The Evangelical Committee for Aid and Development(CEPAD), which represents most of Nicaragua's evangelical churches, issued an urgent plea to U.S. evangelical leaders late last year. A telegram came from CEPAD's president, Dr. Gustavo Parajon, inviting a delegation to come to Nicaragua to witness the progress of the Nicaraguan revolution and the effects of the U.S. operations on the border. We were part of the delegation and spent 10 days in Nicaragua just prior to last Christmas.

We had heard and read many allegations in the U.S. press against the Sandinista government. We went with questions and concerns.

We talked with church people: evangelical pastors, Maryknoll and Baptist missionaries, Catholic priests, a Moravian Miskito pastor, and a representative from the archbishop's office. We spoke with a member of the editorial board of La Prensa, the opposition newspaper.

We were received by top members of the Sandinista government. They spoke openly about tensions within the country and admitted their mistakes in dealing with several problems. It was this quality of self-criticism that most impressed us--something we've not come to expect from leaders of governments. When we asked Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua's 34-year-old chief of state, what he had learned since the triumph, he replied with a smile, "Just about everything."

Despite self-admitted inexperience and mistakes, the commitment of the Sandinista leaders to their people and the improvements made in their tenure leading the country are indisputable. Even the U.S. ambassador admits that they have done "some remarkable things" to improve life in Nicaragua. An interview with him appears on page 19.

One of their first major efforts, in the spirit of Sandino, was a literacy campaign, called by Nicaraguans their "second victory." A hundred thousand young students from Nicaragua's cities went out into the countryside, where they lived with campesino families, teaching them to read. The benefits went both ways, as one teenager shared with us that the experience opened his eyes and educated him in the hardships of Nicaragua's poor. In the six months following the Sandinista victory, illiteracy plummeted from 58 per cent to 12 per cent.

Health care has improved considerably. Infant mortality has declined sharply, and polio has been eradicated from Nicaragua.

A children's park was recently built in the center of Managua, in the shadow of the country's main government building, and the theater that was formerly patronized only by Somoza and his friends now displays community artwork and drama, open free to all Nicaraguans.

From many sources we heard that no one in Nicaragua lacks food. Meat, beans, and rice are readily available, and rarer commodities like refined sugar are rationed. Brown sugar was served with hot drinks when we visited Rene Nunez, secretary of Nicaragua's National Directorate. One of our hosts from CEPAD smiled at this and pointed out that it was a sign of solidarity with the people, most of whom could only afford the unrefined brown sugar.

We noticed a sharp contrast between Nicaraguans that we met in the countryside and refugees from El Salvador in a camp outside Leon. Among the refugees, some of whom had recently fled from El Salvador, we saw signs of severe malnutrition among the children and evidence of trauma among the adults as a result of their recent experiences in their war-torn country.

One of our favorite Nicaraguan specialties was camarones, shrimp from off the coast that are about three times the size of gulf shrimp from the U.S. When we commented on their size to Roger Araica, who works in Nicaragua's fishing industry, he explained that before the victory somocistas, supporters of Somoza, had stolen many of the fishermen's boats and exploited the shrimp crop, harvesting it before the shrimp were mature. But now the shrimp grow to their full size: "We might say that the revolution has also been good for the shrimp."

The inheritance of a bankrupt economy and a $1.5 billion national debt was one of the Sandinistas' major challenges. Following the triumph much of Nicaragua's middle- and upper-class private business sector, believing that Nicaragua would no longer have a profitable business climate, withdrew their investments. Many fled the country; large numbers went to Miami.

The commitment of the Sandinista government has been to meet the needs of all, rather than to cater to the appetites of an elite. Many consumer goods are not available in the country. We were first made aware of this as we went through customs at the airport in Managua. Lined up in front of us were middle-class Nicaraguans with huge suitcases, trunks, and cartons bulging with U.S. goods: Froot Loops, Glad sandwich bags, plastic Christmas decorations, toys, and clothes; they were returning from Christmas shopping in Miami.

The Sandinista customs officials, with a friendly air and lots of apologies, unloaded each box and suitcase, opening presents, checking the seams of clothing. This was also our first reminder that this is a country under siege, with a number of enemies in Miami and other parts of the U.S. Somocistas and former National Guard have organized themselves into camps outside Miami, where they are training for the counterrevolution.

What to do with the National Guard remaining in Nicaragua was another challenge for the young Sandinista leadership. Nicaragua had only one prison with a capacity of 600 because, according to Captain Raul Cordon, director of the penitential system, most of the criminals had connections to Somoza and so never had to worry about the possibility of being jailed, and members of the opposition were killed rather than imprisoned.

One of the revolution's heroes, Commandante Tomas Borge, now Nicaragua's minister of the interior, as a gesture of good will released 3,000 of the National Guard after the triumph, including the man who had tortured him in prison. (Many of these now form the backbone of the contras on the border.) Popular tribunals were set up to try the remaining 5,000 National Guard. Each National Guard member received a three-year prison sentence; additional years were added based on the testimonies of eyewitnesses to their crimes. All cases are currently under review. Unlike most revolutions, this one carried out no mass reprisals or executions.

The government's commitment has been to try to reintegrate the guard into society, working to change the conscience of these men who under Somoza had received psychological training for killing and torture.

The prison system has received commendations from the Red Cross, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and Amnesty International. Prisoners learn trades and receive salaries for their work; 500 had just completed literacy training.

We visited a prison farm and spoke with former members of Somoza's National Guard. None wanted to talk with us about their days in the National Guard. A plaque on the outside wall of the dormitory states, "The past is behind us; we speak of the future."

But the Sandinistas have not received such high marks of praise for their handling of other situations, primarily the Miskito Indian problem. A great deal has been made in the U.S. press about the forced relocation of Miskitos away from the border area where their villages have suffered incursions from the contras.

Norman Bent, a Miskito Indian and highly respected Moravian pastor, gave us hours of his time as we tried to reach an understanding of the truth about this very sensitive situation. Our interview with him begins on page 24. He unfolded the long history of racism and mutual mistrust that exists between the Spanish-speaking people of the West Coast of Nicaragua and the Indians of the East Coast.

He told us that he felt the relocation was a political necessity for the protection of his people, but they were suffering a great culture shock from being uprooted from the land that had been theirs for many years. Other Christians told us that the Indians had to walk many miles to a safe zone, a hardship for them, but that Sandinistas in the area helped to carry children and possessions. The U.S. ambassador admitted that the Miskitos were "reasonably resettled" to land "good or better than before." No one had any evidence of "massacres" of the Miskitos during the relocation, as has been reported in the U.S. press.

The relocation was triggered by "Red Christmas," in which somocistas in Honduras with some Miskito recruits came across the border and attacked the frontier city of San Carlos on December 19, 1981. The Sandinistas sent in reinforcements, 30 soldiers were ambushed and killed by mutilation and burning. This was the first major incursion from the contras, and the method of killing was a sign that it was the work of the National Guard. The Sandinistas reacted by arresting hundreds of Miskitos, innocent people among them.

We were told of isolated incidents of violence from young security officers in the Sandinista effort to integrate the East Coast into the revolutionary process. The Sandinista leadership also made mistakes in its approach to the Indian population. They did not fully respect the indigenous Indian leadership, nor did they understand the role of the Moravian Church to which most Miskitos belong.

But Bent, at the time of our interview under government order not to return to his home on the East Coast (the ban was lifted before we left Nicaragua), was clear in his belief that the Sandinista government is trying to amend its mistakes and work toward reconciliation with the Miskitos. He was also emphatic that the CIA, operating on the border between Nicaragua and Honduras and using the Miskito-Sandinista tension to justify its own ends, is the largest obstacle to that reconciliation: "The Nicaraguan government needs some breathing space, and unless the CIA pulls out of this situation, the Indian people will continue to suffer."

That suffering was very much on the minds of many Nicaraguans as three days before we arrived in Nicaragua, a helicopter carrying 75 Miskito children and nine Miskito women went down in the frontier area. The exact reason for the crash was unknown, but efforts by Sandinista security forces to rescue the passengers were defeated when fire from counterrevolutionaries turned back rescue helicopters. All in the first helicopter died.

We spoke with Steve and Sheila Heneise, American Baptist missionaries from the U.S. who recently fled from the border area. They spoke of rocket attacks from across the border, ambushes, and instances of torture. Two weeks before, some of their colleagues were trying to get food to Miskito refugees, and contras set their truck on fire, burning with it the bridge on which the refugee workers drove.

A second issue that has filled the pages of U.S. reports on Nicaragua is that of "religious persecution." We carried our question about this to a wide range of people in Nicaragua. From evangelical pastors to Maryknoll missionaries to the U.S. ambassador, the response was that no such persecution exists.

Most of the church-state tension is between the Sandinistas and the Catholic hierarchy, in particular with Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo. The archbishop has clearly opposed the Sandinistas. As we talked with Catholics throughout the country, it became apparent that the voice of the archbishop is not the only voice of the Catholic church in Nicaragua. Other Catholic bishops are sympathetic to or supportive of the revolution. A clear difference of opinion exists between the hierarchy and the grassroots popular church.

The archbishop did not see us, but we did meet with his representative, Fr. Bismarck Carballo. In August, 1982, Carballo was involved in a widely publicized incident with one of his married female parishioners that implied sexual misconduct. The scene appeared in Nicaraguan newspapers and on television. Carballo told us this was a "publicity stunt" set up by the state security organization designed to "humiliate me personally and destroy the prestige of the church," a recounting similar to the version that made it into U.S. newspapers. Others, with whom we spoke in Nicaragua, did not accept Carballo's version of the story but believe that the government was wrong to have publicized it. The government also admits that this was a mistake.

When we asked Carballo why the Catholic hierarchy refused to condemn the CIA's support of the counterrevolutionary activities against the people of Nicaragua, which were reported in the November 8,1982 issue of Newsweek, he said simply, "We don't have proof that this is true."

We spoke with several priests who are key members of the Sandinista government. Fr. Miguel D'Escoto, a Maryknoll priest and former editor of Maryknoll magazine who serves as Nicaragua's foreign minister, gave us his reflections about Christian faith and Sandinista thought, which begin on page 14. Fr. Ernesto Cardenal, a poet well known for the gospel reflections that came out of his community of Solentiname and for a dialogue with Dan Berrigan over violence and nonviolence, speaks about his role as minister of culture, beginning on page 22. We also spoke with Fr. Alvaro Arguello, a Jesuit who sits on the Council of State and serves as director of the Central America Historic Institute, an organization devoted to disseminating information about Nicaragua. Our conversations with the priests pointed out what a critical influence their presence has had on the revolution.

The pope has asked all of the priests to step down from their government posts. A compromise was reached in which the priests agreed not to celebrate Mass publicly or privately in order to keep their positions. The pope's visit scheduled for early this month has raised the issue with new force.

The relationship between the government and the evangelical churches is becoming an increasingly important factor in Nicaragua. As the pastors' dialogue that begins on page 20 reflects, most of the Nicaraguan evangelical churches were infected by an anti-communist ideology that arrived with U.S. missionaries.

Some of the most conservative churches were hostile to the revolution and did not want their people to be involved in its programs. Some even called the severe floods of May of last year punishment from God for the revolution. The pastors encouraged their people to refuse health vaccinations and scheduled prayer meetings on the same evenings as literacy training. The most resistant were the Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, and Seventh Day Adventists.

In retaliation for this anti-revolutionary posture, 30 of these church buildings were taken over in late summer of 1982 by Sandinista youth, who attempted to turn them into early childhood centers, libraries, and health centers. Hoping that the problem would settle out, the Sandinista leadership did not interfere, and this was seen by the conservative churches as tacit approval of the takeover and a sign of religious repression. The situation escalated and threatened to get out of hand. The government realized that it had made a mistake and reopened the churches. During this incident, CEPAD played a helpful, mediating role.

In recent years a conversion has taken place in the evangelical churches, and CEPAD has been a central part of it. The Evangelical Committee for Aid and Development was born four days after the earthquake in 1972. Dr. Gustavo Parajon tried to have the relief aid released from the grasp of Somoza.

When he was unsuccessful, he gathered evangelical Christians together to begin relief work. Within six weeks 1,100 volunteers were serving 30,000 hot breakfasts daily in local churches to children and pregnant women. Shortly afterward, Parajon received a call from Somoza saying, "We've been planning this for years; how did you do it in six weeks?"

The evangelicals began to understand the potential of Christians working together. Biblical reflection began to take on a new light. The story of John and Peter with the lame man (Acts 3:1-11) became a key one; the apostles had not given the man money, but they gave him dignity. Working with the poor of Nicaragua for dignity and justice became the basis of CEPAD housing, medical, and agricultural projects that sprang up all over the country. These projects can now be found in 400 communities.

Parajon, whose interview begins on page 29, shared with us that CEPAD has worked with the new government on several projects, including a housing project on government land that we visited. Ignacio Hernandez, director of the Nicaraguan Bible Society, points out on page 23 that conditions in the country have never been so good for spreading the Word.

Our hosts from CEPAD shared that they and all Nicaraguans have a great deal of access to the Sandinista leaders. We were convinced of this the evening we met with Daniel Ortega. After each member of our delegation had stepped forward to shake the hand of the chief of state and the television cameras had stopped rolling, Gilberto Aguirre of CEPAD stepped up, smiled, and said, "Daniel!" and the two embraced. We explained that we do not have such a relationship with Ronald Reagan.

This access is coupled with a high degree of participation by the Nicaraguan people in the revolutionary process, a fact admitted by even the U.S. ambassador. We did not discover the "Marxist totalitarian regime" that is reported in the U.S. Several government leaders admitted that they have been influenced by Marx, largely as a result of analyzing and reflecting on the rampant, exploitative capitalism that for years dominated and destroyed their economy. However, many of the leaders with whom we talked are Christians and stated that Jesus Christ has had the far greater influence.

The Sandinista government has also experienced some defections. It has lost two ambassadors to the U.S. in two years. The first is now working for the Inter-American Development Bank, and the second, it was recently revealed, embezzled $600,000 of Nicaraguan government money and then resigned. He is now in hiding. One of Nicaragua's revolutionary heroes, Eden Pastora, has left the country to organize a new Nicaraguan government. Some observers, especially in the U.S., believe the conflict between Pastora and the Sandinistas is over the political direction of the revolution. Others, including those outside the government with whom we talked in Nicaragua, told us they think it is more of a personality clash and power struggle.

Like any nation, especially one in the years following a revolutionary triumph, Nicaragua is not exempt from the problem of individuals and groups vying for position and influence in the new regime. That certainly was the experience after the American revolution for independence. In such an atmosphere, charges and counter-charges tend to fly. Most countries just need time to sort out those internal problems without interference from the outside.

Critics in the U.S. often attack Nicaragua for not holding elections. Parajon stated that this criticism shows a lack of understanding of the Nicaraguan situation. The popular support of the revolution was so widespread that the Sandinistas would have been guaranteed a victory following the triumph. No other party in Nicaragua has more than a few hundred members, though all are free to organize. Elections are expensive to carry out, and more pressing needs demanded the country's scarce resources, such as literacy and agriculture. The Sandinistas wanted first to educate the people so that they could be better prepared to make choices about their political future. Elections have been promised in 1985. And as Parajon points out, it was nine years after the American revolution that the first national election took place.

We hear reports in the U.S. of large numbers of Cuban military advisers in Nicaragua. About 2,000 Cuban doctors and teachers arrived in Nicaragua following the triumph to help the country get back on its feet. The government does admit the presence of some Cuban military advisers but insists their numbers are small.

The Nicaraguans with whom we talked, even in the churches, had great appreciation for the help their country had received from the Cuban doctors and teachers, who in many cases had given of themselves very sacrificially. None of the Nicaraguans seemed to feel their independence was threatened by the Cubans. U.S. missionary Sheila Heneise shared with us how one of the Cuban doctors saved the life of her 2-year-old daughter who was suffering from malaria.

The Sandinista government has also been strongly criticized for its press censorship, particularly of the opposition newspaper, La Prensa. Roberto Cardenal of the paper's editorial board shared with us the history of La Prensa, which was also an opposition paper during Somoza's regime. He reminded us that the paper had helped in the overthrow of Somoza, and claimed that it supported the revolution until it began to move in a "totalitarian direction." What he failed to mention in recounting the history was that about two and a half years ago business interests on the board became concerned about the pro-revolutionary stance of La Prensa and fired its director. Three-quarters of the editors and editorial staff resigned and started another paper, El Nuevo Diario (The New Daily), which should be considered the more rightful descendant of the anti-Somoza La Prensa.

Many people spoke of distortions in La Prensa's reporting. A shooting in the town of Masaya in which Sandinistas were killed was reported as an attack by Sandinistas. La Prensa has reported false food shortages, which frightened people into panic buying so that the report became true. Like Carballo, Cardenal did not know if it was true that the CIA was operating on the border.

Several people, both Nicaraguans and Americans in Nicaragua, who do not agree with the press censorship, said that it is to the Sandinistas' credit that they have not shut the paper down completely. That they might be tempted to do so is understandable given the history of conservative papers in Latin America, such as El Mercurio in Chile and others that were used as propaganda tools by the CIA in campaigns to overthrow legitimate governments.

Overriding in our conversations with Nicaraguan Christians and government leaders was the fact that whatever problems Nicaragua is having are made vastly worse by the U.S. presence on the border. The Sandinistas have made repeated efforts to dialogue with the U.S. government through Thomas Enders, assistant secretary of state for Inter-American affairs. Nicaragua has agreed to a dialogue between the two nations mediated by Mexico, an initiative that came from the Mexican president and was rejected by the Reagan administration.

Since the U.S. government accuses Nicaragua of shipping arms to insurgents in El Salvador and uses this to justify its action against Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega proposed a joint border patrol with Nicaraguan and U.S. forces on the Honduran border. The effect would be to prevent any possible arms flow as well as to protect Nicaragua from counterrevolutionary attacks. The U.S. has refused.

The Reagan administration has supplied millions of dollars of weapons and aid to Nicaragua's neighbors, but when Nicaragua asked about receiving U.S. protection, Reagan offered, according to Ortega, "uniforms and canteens." Ortega outlined for us his view of our government's position:

The problem here for the prevent administration of the United States is not the supposed Cuban or Soviet presence in Nicaragua. The great concern of the United States government is the fact that a revolution has triumphed here. This raises the morale of combat and desire for change in the nations of the region. And this worries the North American leaders. As an element of propaganda, to justify their attitude toward Nicaragua, then exaggerate, then invent, they speak in terms designed to sow terror in the North American population.

The response of the United States is to promote coups d'etat, as in Chile, breaking the [democratic] institutional framework that they themselves invented.

We find that we in Latin America are up against an historical conduct by the United States that does not change with different administrations. This is a problem the Nicaraguan revolution faces: that it triumphs in a moment when the United States is assuming a government that is most clearly defending this traditional line of North American policy. So the Reagan administration will use all its resources to find a way to disfigure the revolution from within, to destabilize the revolution. The aspiration of the Reagan administration is to destroy the revolution.

But despite U.S. aggression at their door, the Nicaraguans have an indomitable spirit. They have lived through the terrible darkness of Somoza and now have great hope for a brighter future.

We asked Ortega what he would consider the most important thing he has learned in the time that he has led his country. He responded:

The most important is that every day we reconfirm the force of the people participating in the construction of their society. With every task that's placed to the revolution--economic affairs, education, health, defense--the response of the people is unbelievable. Many times the mathematical calculations will say that you can't achieve a certain goal. But when the people get involved, we achieve more than the goal.

We believe that something unprecedented in Central America is happening in Nicaragua. What Nicaragua most needs is a chance--to solve its own problems, to make its own mistakes, to live without an enemy on its border--and for the first time in a very long time to determine its own future.

Jim Wallis is editor-in-chief of Sojourners. Joyce Hollyday was associate editor of Sojourners when this article appeared.